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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KATHY GARCIA, ] 
Plaintiff and ] 
Appellant ] 
v. ; 
DAVID WARREN and DON WORTLEY 
Defendants and 
Respondents. ; 
i Case No. 880659-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the 
Court of Appeals by Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-
3(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), Rule 4A, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
and Rule 4A, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does an issue of material fact exist regarding the 
defendants1 degree of control and responsibilities regarding 
maintenance of their building? 
2. Does an issue of material fact exist regarding 
whether the defendants encouraged their lessee to maintain the 
premises poorly and in an unsafe manner? 
2 
3. Does an issue of material fact exist regarding 
whether the defendants exercised reasonable care under the 
circumstances toward their tenant's employees? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Kathy Garcia ("Garcia"), was injured when a 
handrail she was using came loose while she was entering her 
place of employment. Garcia sued respondents David Warren and 
Don Wortley ("Lessors"), lessors of the building, alleging 
negligence in repairing, or failing to repair, the loose 
handrail. Lessors moved for summary judgment based on a lease 
provision purportedly assigning responsibility for building 
maintenance to their tenant, ServiCar, Inc« 
On September 1, 1988, the district court signed an Order 
granting the lessors1 Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 184) The 
district court concluded that appellee Wortleyfs participation in 
the decision to allow the building to fall into disrepair was 
legally irrelevant in light of the contractual provisions of the 
lease. (R. 185) The court further held that the fact that 
Lessors were contributing to and encouraging the poor maintenance 
of the building also was irrelevant, because of the lease 
provision. (R.185). The court found that appellee Wortley's 
reluctance to contribute greater funds to the operation of 
ServiCar, resulting in poor maintenance of the building, was also 
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factually inadequate to defeat summary judgment in light of the 
lease provision. (R. 185). Finally, the court found that the 
affidavit of Kathy Garcia contained bare assertions and was 
legally insufficient to raise an issue of material fact with 
respect to those assertions. (R. 185-6). The court did not hold 
that the evidence was insufficient to create such factual 
inferences. Rather, the court assumed that such factual 
inferences did exist, but found them to be legally irrelevant. 
(R. 185). 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Respondent Don Wortley is a licensed physical therapist 
and is engaged in other health care service businesses. (R. 2 00, 
pp. 5-6). Sometime in 1978, he purchased a Utah corporation, 
ServiCar of Utah, which was engaged primarily in the business of 
transporting handicapped persons. (R. 200, p. 12). ServiCar was 
purchased by Mr. Wortley primarily to facilitate his other health 
care-related businesses. (R.200, p. 13). Subsequent to the 
purchase of the business, defendant David Warren became the 
manager of ServiCar. (R. 200, p. 11). A substantial portion of 
the funding for ServiCar1s operations came from Lessors. (R. 
200, pp. 13-14). 
Prior to the date of Kathy Garcia's injury, David Warren and 
Don Wortley, acting as equal partners in a joint venture known as 
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W & W Investments, purchased a building at 93 0 West Jewel Avenue, 
intending to lease it to ServiCar. (R. 75, 202, p. 14). 
Approximately a year prior to the Garcia accident, Lessors began 
leasing their building to the ServiCar corporation. Throughout 
the course of this litigation, Lessors were unable to produce a 
copy of the lease agreement between Lessors and ServiCar. (R. 
81-82). Lessors assert, however, that the lease expressly 
assigned maintenance responsibilities to ServiCar. (R. 75-76, 
82) . 
On December 10, 1984, appellant, Kathy K. Garcia 
("Garcia"), was an employee of ServiCar. On that date, as Garcia 
was climbing the stairs to get to her work station, a handrail 
she was using separated from the wall, causing her to fall. (R. 
2, 88-89). As a result, Garcia received serious personal 
injuries and suffered economic loss. (R. 3, 89). 
In the weeks prior to the date of Kathy!s accident, David 
Warren had been warned of the dangerous condition of the railing. 
(R. 202, p. 19). Lessors also knew that Garcia, who was 
physically handicapped, sometimes went upstairs into the building 
by using the handrail to pull herself up. (R. 202, pp. 30-31). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in ruling that the lease agreement 
between Lessors and their tenant was dispositive. Even if the 
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written terms of the lease provision purported to assign 
maintenance responsibility to the tenant, the actual conduct of 
the parties more accurately reflects their intentions. 
Furthermore, conduct of the parties inconsistent with the terms 
of the lease creates an ambiguity in the lease agreement, which 
should be resolved by the jury. If, in reality, Lessors were 
also responsible for building maintenance, liability may be 
imposed upon Lessors for negligence in performing such 
maintenance. 
The trial court also erred in disregarding Lessors' 
financial hold on their tenant. Factual inferences that Lessors 
exerted substantial control over building maintenance through 
control of the purse strings, are relevant in determining 
Lessors1 liability for improper maintenance. Additionally, 
Lessors' knowing attempt to assign maintenance responsibilities 
to a nearly insolvent entity was in breach of their duty to 
exercise reasonable care. Moreover, the agreement between 
Lessors and their tenant cannot be allowed to impair the rights 
of a third party. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TERMS OF A LEASE AGREEMENT 
DO NOT DEFINE A LESSOR'S 
MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITIES 
WHEN THE LESSOR IN FACT 
CONTINUES TO EXERCISE CONTROL 
OVER BUILDING MAINTENANCE,, 
Because "summary judgment deprives a party of its 
opportunity to present its case on the merits, [the court of 
appeals] review[s] the facts and inferences in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the judgment was granted." 
Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 100 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 16 (Ct. App. 
Jan. 12, 1989) . In this case, the sole basis for the District 
Court's order granting Lessors' motion for summary judgment is 
the existence, assumed by both parties1, of a lease agreement 
purportedly shifting responsibility for maintenance of the 
building in question to Lessors' tenant, ServiCar of Utah, Inc.2 
The District Court did not find that the evidence was factually 
inadequate to establish that the Lessors were, in fact, 
exercising control over building maintenance. Rather, the court 
found the lease agreement to be dispositive, and ruled that the 
1
 Lessors were unable to locate the 'alleged lease during 
the course of this litigation. 
2
 ServiCar of Utah, Inc. was Garcia's employer. Following 
the accident Garcia sought and received Workers' Compensation 
benefits from ServiCar's worker's compensation insurer. ServiCar 
is not involved in this litigation. 
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fact that the lessors retained control over the maintenance of 
the building, and encouraged the poor maintenance of the 
building, were irrelevant in light of the lease agreement. (R. 
185) . 
In so ruling, the court assigned undue significance to the 
claimed lease provision. Even if the lease agreement by its 
terms placed the responsibility for maintenance upon ServiCar, 
the fact that the parties1 conduct contradicted that provision 
would establish a basis for imposing liability upon the landlord. 
The Utah Supreme Court has noted on several occasions that 
parties1 conduct may be more indicative of the actual terms of a 
contract than the contract itself. See, e.g., Eie v. St. 
Benedictf s Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 1981) ("Though 
arguably clear on its face, where the parties demonstrate by 
their actions that to them the contract meant something quite 
different, the intent of the parties will be enforced."); 
Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 271 
(1972) ("[W]hen parties place their own construction on their 
agreement and so perform, the court may consider this as 
persuasive evidence of what their true intention was."); Licrnell 
v. Berg, 593 P. 2d 800 (Utah 1979) (formal contract designating 
parties joint venturers was not determinative of parties' status, 
where designation was known to be convenient fiction); Harry L. 
Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316 (Utah 1975) 
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(employment status depends on facts and circumstances, not 
necessarily terms of parties' agreement); Centurian Corp. v. 
Cripps, 624 P. 2d 706 (Utah 1981) (whether transaction purporting 
to be a lease is actually a sale depends on facts of each case.) 
The reasoning behind those decisions is that parties 
create ambiguity in a contract by engaging in conduct which 
contradicts the written language of the contract. In this case, 
where the lease agreement is not available for inspection by the 
parties or the court, the lease can hardly be considered 
unambiguous on its face. Consequently, the jury should be 
entitled to consider contradictory conduct of Lessors and their 
tenant when deciding whether any assignment of responsibilities 
actually took place. 
That conclusion seems particularly appropriate when, as 
here, the rights of an innocent third party are impaired by the 
contract. If Lessors actually retained and exercised control 
over the premises leased to ServiCar, the lease provision cannot 
prevail against the reality of the situation. Furthermore, that 
reality is highly relevant to Garciafs claim in this case. Under 
Utah law, liability may be imposed upon a lessor for injuries 
caused by conditions for which the lessor is responsible'. In 
Stephenson v. Warner, 581 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah 1978), the Utah 
Supreme Court noted: 
It is not to be doubted that a landlord is bound by 
the usual standard of exercising ordinary prudence 
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and care to see that premises he leases are 
reasonably safe and suitable for intended uses, nor 
that under appropriate circumstances he may be held 
liable for injuries caused by any defects or 
dangerous conditions which he created, or of which 
he was aware, and which he should reasonably have 
foreseen would expose others to an unreasonable 
risk of harm.3 
The fact that Lessors retained control of, and 
responsibility for, building maintenance, could lead a jury to 
conclude that Lessors were responsible for the loose handrail 
which caused Garcia1s injuries. Under applicable Utah case law, 
therefore, a material issue of fact exists in this matter, 
rendering improper the trial court's order granting summary 
judgment. 
POINT II. 
AN ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS 
REGARDING THE LESSORS1 CONTROL OVER 
MAINTENANCE OF THE BUILDING. 
The District Court held that the Lessors' personal funding 
of ServiCar and encouragement of ServiCar to maintain the 
building poorly were factually inadequate to raise an inference 
3
 In Stephenson, unlike the instant case, the cause of the 
explosion and fire which injured plaintiff could not be 
determined. The court held that liability could not be imposed 
upon the landlord, because there was "no reasonable basis in the 
evidence to support the plaintiff's claims: either that it was 
the water heater that actually caused the fire; . . . or that the 
gas water heater necessarily constituted a dangerous condition; 
or more importantly, that the defendant landlord, Mr. Greenwood, 
was responsible for any such condition.11 Id. at 569. 
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that building maintenance was in fact the responsibility of 
Lessors as well as their tenant. The court's finding erroneously 
disregards the effect of that funding arrangement. 
In this case, Lessors — and lessor Wortley in particular 
— essentially underwrote ServiCar's operations. From Lessors1 
own testimony, it is clear that ServiCar was never intended, or 
expected, to be financially independent. According to lessor 
Wortley, "there was never an economic interest, or business 
interest on ServiCar. We did that [purchased the business] so 
that we could facilitate the other aspects of our business.11 (R. 
200, p. 13). Wortley further admitted that "we never have made a 
profit with ServiCar, but we have always tried. That is really a 
tongue-in-cheek •try1." (R. 200, p. 13). 
As Wortley testified, "ServiCar is ostensibly a business, 
it's really a disease. Once you get it, you get infected with 
it, you can't let it alone. Anybody that has ever touched it, 
that I know, just keeps putting — it's a hole in the world 
through which you pour money." (R. 200, p. 14). 
The significance of ServiCar's financial dependence on 
lessors becomes apparent in light of the fact that Lessors 
purchased the building with the sole intent of leasing it to 
ServiCar. (R. 202, p. 14). Lessors plainly knew that their 
tenant, ServiCar, could not afford to make repairs without a 
constant infusion of funds by lessors. Aware of this fact, 
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Lessors nonetheless leased the premises to ServiCar, and drafted 
a lease agreement assigning ServiCar responsibility for 
maintenance of the building. A jury could reasonably infer that 
Lessors breached their duty of reasonable care not only by 
knowingly leasing a building to a nearly insolvent entity, but 
also by shifting responsibility for repairs to a tenant who 
Lessors knew did not have the necessary funds. Consequently, the 
trial court erred in concluding that ServiCarfs financial 
dependence on Lessors was irrelevant. 
The trial court also erred in failing to recognize the 
impact of the funding arrangement between Lessors and ServiCar on 
the performance of maintenance responsibilities. The simplest 
means of illustrating the effect of ServiCar1s financial 
dependence on Lessors might be through the following hypothetical 
scenario: 
Suppose L recognizes that T, a stranger, needs to move to a 
different facility in the near future. L purchases a building 
with the sole intent of renting it to T, and suggests to T that T 
lease the building. To limit his exposure, L tells T that T will 
have to assume responsibility for maintenance of the building. T 
explains to L that T is struggling financially, and simply could 
not afford to pay rent and make repairs. L, faced with losing 
his tenant and the tenant's rental payments, tells T not to 
worry, that L will give T a break on the rent, if necessary, to 
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enable T to afford repairs. 
On numerous occasions during the next year, T consults with 
L about necessary repairs. On certain occasions T makes repairs 
and is allowed an offset against his rent. On other occasions L 
advises T that no repair is "really needed" and T decides not to 
make the repair. Later, T approaches L about the need to repair 
a loose handrail. L, tired of "pouring" money into maintenance 
of the building, advises T that the handrail does not really need 
repaired, and that L will not allow T to offset from his rent the 
expense of repairing the handrail. T, financially unsound, does 
not repair the handrail, and one of his employees is injured as a 
result. 
In this scenario, L clearly exercised real control over 
maintenance of the building, regardless of the terms of the lease 
provision. At the very least, the two entities maintained the 
building as a joint enterprise, and thus became jointly liable 
for negligence in the performance of that enterprise.4 
4
 Under that scenario, and under the similar facts of the 
instant case, the elements of a joint enterprise would appear to 
be present: 
(1) An agreement, express or implied, among the 
members of the group; (2) a common purpose to be 
carried out by the group; (3) a community of 
pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the 
members; and (4) an equal right to a voice in the 
direction of the enterprise, which gives an equal 
right of control. 
Utah Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 738 P.2d 652, 
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The same conclusion is dictated by the circumstances of the 
instant case. Lessors admittedly "poured" money into ServiCar to 
enable ServiCar to perform its essential operations, including 
repairs, and were aware that inadequate funding limited 
ServiCar's ability to repair. Lessor Wortley testified: 
Q. . . . Did David [Warren] do a pretty good 
job of taking care of the building in 
general? 
A. I thought so, as good as he could do with the 
money he hadf that was always a problem. 
(R. 200, p. 24 (emphasis added)). 
Despite that knowledge, Lessors knowingly refused to provide 
sufficient funds for repairs, exemplified by lessor Wortleyfs 
testimony that the vans used by ServiCar to transport handicapped 
persons were "held together with bailing wire and chewing gum." 
(R. 200, p. 16) . A jury could reasonably infer that Lessors 
knowingly attempted to shift responsibility for repairs to a 
financially insolvent entity, which constituted a breach of duty 
toward appellant Garcia and others. A jury could also infer that 
the funding arrangement between Lessors and ServiCar gave Lessors 
control in fact over maintenance, rendering the parties jointly 
responsible for the improper maintenance of the building. Such 
inferences are clearly relevant to issues of liability, and thus 
655 (Utah App. 1987), quoting Mukasey v. Aaron, 20 Utah 2d 383, 
438 P.2d 702, 704 (Utah 1968). 
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summary judgment was improper. 
POINT III. 
AN ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS AS TO 
WHETHER LESSORS BREACHED THEIR DUTY OF 
REASONABLE CARE. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently recognized that 
[t]he common law duty of a landlord has been 
expanded in virtually every state, either 
judicially or by statute, beyond the narrow common 
law categories . . . [T]his court has charged 
landlords with a duty to exercise reasonable care 
toward their tenants in all circumstances. 
Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985); see also 
Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments, Ltd., 754 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah 
App. 1988) . Any attempt by Lessors to avoid that duty by 
contract with their tenant cannot be binding on an innocent third 
party. 
In Tanauav v. Marston, 127 N.H. 572, 503 A.2d 834 (1986), 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court was faced with virtually 
identical circumstances. Noting that a landlord has a duty to 
exercise reasonable care under all circumstances, the court held 
that a lease provision assigning maintenance responsibilities and 
liability for damages did not bar the tenant's employee from 
suing the landlord: 
[W]e note that, as between themselves, a lessor and 
lessee in a lease of commercial real estate may 
agree on which party will maintain the leased 
premises and which party will be liable for 
injuries caused by improper failure to maintain. . 
While exculpatory clauses in leases of 
commercial real estate are binding on the parties 
to the lease, they have no effect on non-signers, 
such as the plaintiff. 
503 A.2d at 838 (emphasis added). 
In this case, Lessors contend that the lease provision 
automatically absolves them of liability arising from improper 
maintenance of the building. In that respect, the maintenance 
agreement is indistinguishable in effect from a typical 
exculpatory provision purporting to shield a lessor from 
liability. The majority of courts considering exculpatory 
provisions in a lease have held that such provisions do not bar a 
third party's recovery from the lessor for injuries received on 
the premises. See, e.g., Annotation, "Effect, on nonsigner, of 
provision of lease exempting landlord from liability on account 
of condition of property," 12 A.L.R. 3d 958 (1988 Supp.), and 
cases cited therein. 
The reasoning underlying those holdings was explained by 
the court in Kirkland v. Western Electric Company, Inc., 296 
So. 2d 350 (La. App. 1974). Holding that two parties could not 
fix the employment status of an individual "with respect to 
rights belonging to and obligations owed by third parties who are 
not in any way parties to the contract," the court in Kirkland 
illustrated the principle in the lessor-tenant context: 
The owner of a building and a tenant storekeeper 
may enter into a contract for ultimate 
responsibility to business invitees of the parties 
to the agreement but they cannot deprive such a 
business invitee of any legal right he may have to 
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proceed against either of the parties to the 
contract. . . . If company A, financially strong, 
contracted with company B, hopelessly insolvent, 
and they agreed that B's employees would at all 
times be considered B's employees, and if an 
employee of B, while a true borrowed servant of A, 
negligently injured a plaintiff, it could hardly be 
said that plaintiff's right to proceed against A 
was precluded because of the contract between A and 
B. 
Id. at 353-354. 
The concerns stated by the Kirkland court are present in 
this case. From lessor Wortley's own testimony, a jury could 
infer that the lease agreement regarding maintenance was merely 
an attempt to shield a financially strong entity from liability, 
using a financially weak entity with related interests to perform 
that function. 
In this case, the District Court placed undue significance 
on the terms of the alleged lease agreement. In so holding, the 
court improperly allowed the agreement between Lessors and 
ServiCar to impair the rights of a third party. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, justice requires that this 
Court reverse the summary judgment granted by the District Court 
in the instant case. 
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DATED this day of February, 1989. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
By_ 
Lee C. Henning 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Pl/aintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the j \ day of February, 1989, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage 
prepaid thereon, to the following: 
Stanley M. Smedley 
Bean & Smedley 
190 South Fort Lane, Suite #2 
Layton, Utah 84 041 
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?<r IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHY K. GARCIA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID WARREN and DON WORTLEY, 
Defefendants. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No 
Judge m%-{,70? 
Plaintiff, Kathy K. Garcia, hereby complains against the 
Defendants, David Warren and Don Wortley and alleges as follows: 
le The Plaintiff, at the present and at the time of the 
incident complained of, is a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. At the time of the incident complained of, the 
Defendants were owners of a building located at 930 Jewel Avenue, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. At the time of the incident complained of, the 
Plaintiff's employer, ServiCar of Utah, was a lessor of the 
building owned by Defendants. 
4. On or about December 10, 1984, Kathy was climbing the 
stairs at work, usisng the railing to support her weight when the 
railing separated from the wall causing Kathy to twist and fall, 
making severe pains shoot up and down her legs. 
5. The Defendants had actual knowledge of the dangerous 
condition of the railing which broke free from the wall. 
6. As a result of the twisting and falling the Plaintiff 
suffered severe personal injuries including a permanent 
disability, and severe pain and suffering. 
7. Also as a result of the fall the Plaintiff has 
suffered lost wages, incurred medical expenses, and has suffered 
a diminished earning capacity. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
8. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 7 of her complaint. 
9. The Defendants acted knowingly, wilfully, and 
recklessly, in refusing to correct the deficiency in the railing 
entitling the plaintiff to an award of punitive damages. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against 
Defendants, David Warren and Don Wortley as follows: 
1. Reimbursement of all medical expenses in an amount to 
be proved at trial. 
2. Reimbursement for all present and future lost wages 
in an amount to be proved at trial. 
3. An award for diminished earning capacity in an amount 
of $100,000.00. 
4. An award for pain and suffering in the amount of 
$250,000.00. 
5. An award for punitive damages in the amount of 
$250,000.00. 
6. Interest, costs, attorney's fees, and such further 
relief as this Court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this -S day of August, 1986. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Plaintiff's Address: 
Hennn 
Attorneys for Plainti'ff 
ng J 
261 East Cordelia 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHY GARCIA, ) 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, ) 
VS. ) CIVIL NO. C86-6709 
DAVID WARREN AND DON WORTLEY, ) 
DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS.) 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED ORDER 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
SEPTEMBER 1, 1988 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT: LEE C. HENNING, #4593 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN S POWELL, P.C 
510 CLARK LEAMING BUILDING 
175 SOUTH WEST TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
FOR THE DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS: STAN SMEDLEY 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
190 SOUTH FORT LANE 
SUITE 2 
LAYTON, UTAH 84041 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
CIVIL NO 
COURT: 
HENNING 
COURT: 
1988; 9:00 A.M. 
THIS IS THE CASE OF KATHY GARCIA --
: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
— VS. DAVID WARREN AND DON 
. C86-6709. CAN WE HAVE THE PARTIES 
FOR THE RECORD? 
MR. 
MR. 
MR. 
THE TWO ( 
THE 
SURE IF 
MR. 
HENNING 
SMEDLEY 
HENNING 
3R0P0SED 
COURT: 
: LEE HENNING FOR THE 
: STAN SMEDLEY FOR THE 
: HAS THE COURT HAD AN 
ORDERS, YOUR HONOR? 
I WAS JUST GOING OVER 
[ HAVE BOTH OF THEM HERE. 
HENNING : LET ME HAND YOU THE 
ORDER, YOUR HONOR. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
SMEDLEY 
OKAY. 
: DOES THE COURT HAVE 
SUBMITTED? IF NOT, I'LL --
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
SMEDLEY 
COURT: 
HENNING 
I DON'T THINK SO. 
: I CAN SUBMIT MY FILE 
ALL RIGHT. 
W0R7LEY, 
IDENTIFY THEMSELVES 
PLAINTIFF. 
DEFENDANTS. 
OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW 
THOSE AND I'M NOT QUITE 
ORIGINAL OF MY PROPOSED 
DEFENDANTS' ORDER THAT WAS 
COPY. 
YOUR HONOR, I OBJECTED TO 
ORDER FOR TWO REASONS REALLY. FIRST OF 
RECALL THE ORAL ARGUMENT ON THIS MATTER 
ARGUMENTS I WAS TRYING TO MAKE WHEN THE 
ALL, 
COUNSEL'S PROPOSED 
IF THE COURT WILL 
, THERE WERE ONLY TWO 
COURT ' GRANTED THE | 
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DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. YOU RECALL THERE WAS 
A WRITTEN LEASE PROVISION BETWEEN SERVICAR OF UTAH, THE 
PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYER, AND THE LANDLORDS, DAVID WARREN AND 
DON WORTLEY, THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS ACTION. AND THE WRITTEN 
LEASE PROVISION BETWEEN THE EMPLOYER/TENANT AND THE LANDLORDS 
MADE THE TENANT RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE BUILDING. 
AND IN MY MOTION OR IN MY AFFIDAVIT AND IN MY ARGUMENT, I 
ARGUED INFERRENTIALLY THAT REGARDLESS OF THE LEASE PROVISION, 
IN REALITY THE LANDLORDS SHARED IN THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
MAINTENANCE OF THE BUILDING. 
AND A SECOND AND VERY CLOSELY-RELATED ARGUMENT WAS 
THAT EVEN IF THE LANDLORDS WERE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTENANCE 
OF THE BUILDING, THAT THEY HAD ENCOURAGED THE TENANTS AND 
IN EFFECT INSISTED THAT THE TENANT MAINTAINED THE BUILDING 
IMPROPERLY. AND I JUST WANT THE COURT ORDER TO DEAL WITH BOTH 
OF THOSE ISSUES THAT I RAISED TO CLARIFY THE COURT'S POSITION 
FOR POTENTIAL APPEAL. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. HENNING: AND I DON'T FEEL COUNSEL DEALT WITH BOTH 
ISSUES. 
MR. SMEDLEY: YOUR HONOR, MR. HENNING. I FEEL, YOUR 
HONOR, THAT REALLY THE EFFORT OF THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS REGARD 
IN OBJECTION TO THE ORDER THAT WE HAVE SUBMITTED IS REALLY 
A VEILED ATTEMPT UPON HER PART TO SET THIS CORE UP FOR THE 
BASIS OF THE REVERSAL OF THE COURT'S RULING IN THE EVENT OF AN 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
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1 APPEAL. THE ITEMS THAT ARE SET FORTH IN THE ORDER WHICH 
2 PLAINTIFF HAS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT FOR CONSIDERATION ARE 
3 CLEARLY NOT CONSISTENT WITH WHAT THE FACTS OF THIS CARE ARE OR 
4 WHAT THE EVIDENCE THAT HAS BEEN PRESENTED BEFORE THE COURT TO 
5 BE IS. 
6 AND SPECIFICALLY IN THAT REGARD, YOUR HONOR, I WOULD 
7 CALL THE COURT'S ATTENTION TO PLAINTIFF'S ORDER ON PAGE 2, 
8 PARAGRAPHS B, C, AND D. I WOULD SUBMIT TO THE COURT THAT 
9 PLAINTIFF SAYS THAT THE FACT THAT DON WORTLEY WAS CONSTANTLY 
10 FUNDING SERVICAR'S OPERATION WITH HIS OWN FUNDS AND THAT THE 
11 DECISION TO ALLOW THE BUILDING TO FALL INTO DISREPAIR WAS A 
12 DECISION BASED IN BY DON WORTLEY, AND THE INFERENCE RAISED FROM 
13 THOSE FACTS THAT THE LANDLORDS, DAVID WARREN AND DON WORTLEY, WERE 
14 CONTRIBUTING AND ENCOURAGING THE POOR MAINTENANCE OF THE 
15 BUILDING, HE THEN SAYS, ARE IRRELEVANT. 
16 I WOULD SUBMIT TO THE COURT THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO 
17 EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT AT THIS TIME THAT THAT ASSERTION OF 
18 FACT IS TRUE. THERE IS JUST NOTHING THERE. IN FACT, COUNSEL 
19 IN THEIR MEMORANDUM TO THE COURT QUOTED A NUMBER OF ITEMS FROM 
20 THE DEPOSITION OF DON WORTLEY THAT WAS TAKEN IN FEBRUARY OF »87. 
21 AND IN FACT, THE DEPOSITION OF MR. WORTLEY ON PAGE 15, LINES 1 
22 THROUGH 10 SHOW THAT APPROXIMATELY 12 MONTHS BEFORE THE PLAINTIFF 
,23 WAS INJURED THAT THERE WAS BROUGHT INTO THE OWNERSHIP OF 
24 SERVICAR, FOR WHOM SHE WAS EMPLOYED, INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE. 
25 J AND THAT PRIOR TO THIS TIME, PRIOR TO THE TIME THAT INTERMOUNTAIN 
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1
 HEALTH CARE WAS BROUGHT INTO THIS, THAT THERAPY MANAGEMENT 
2
 INCORPORATED WAS THE OWNER OF SERVICAR. IT WAS NEVER AND HAS 
3 NOT BEEN A SITUATION WHERE DON WORTLEY OR DAVID WARREN, 
4 EITHER TOGETHER OR SEPARATELY, WERE OWNERS OF SERVICAR, AND THAT 
5 THEY THEN MADE A CONSCIENTIOUS DECISION AS COUNSEL WOULD 
6
 REPRESENT IN THE PROPOSED ORDER TO ALLOW THE BUILDING TO FALL 
7
 INTO DISREPAIR. IT'S SIMPLY NOT THE CASE. THERE IS NOTHING 
8
 THAT WOULD SUGGEST THAT OR SHOW THAT NOR HAS THERE BEEN ANY 
9
 EVIDENCE PRESENTED. 
10
 NOW, IN SUBPARAGRAPH B OF THEIR PROPOSED ORDER, THEY 
11
 SAY THE FACT THAT DON WORTLEY WAS CONTRIBUTING HIS OWN FUNDS 
12
 ON A MONTHLY BASIS TO UNDERWRITE THE OPERATION OF THE TENANT 
13
 AND THAT IT WAS HIS RELUCTANCE TO CONTRIBUTE GREATER FUNDS THAT 
14
 RESULTED IN THE POOR MAINTENANCE OF THE BUILDING ARE ALSO 
15
 FACTUALLY INADEQUATE TO RAISE THE INFERENCE THAT THE BUILDING 
16
 MAINTAINED WAS REALLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LANDLORDS. 
17
 THE EVIDENCE AGAIN, YOUR HONOR, IS THE SAME IN BOTH CASES. 
18
 THERE JUST IS NOTHING TO SHOW THAT IT WAS DON WORTLEY'S OR 
19
 DAVID WARREN'S RESPONSIBILITY TO DO THAT. 
20
 SERVICAR, WHO RAN THE BUSINESS AND WHO OPERATED IT, 
21
 WAS A CORPORATION. IT WAS A CORPORATION THAT WAS OWNED AND 
22
 HELD BY ANOTHER CORPORATION, THIS INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH 
23
 I CARE, FOR AT LEAST A YEAR OR APPROXIMATELY A YEAR PRIOR TO THE 
TIME THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED. MR. WORTLEY AND MR. WARREN 24 
2 5
 SIMPLY WERE NOT THE ONES IN THE POSITION TO DO THAT 
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NOW, THE LAST PARAGRAPH IS SIMPLY A STATEMENT BY 
KATHY GARCIA WHICH SAYS IT WAS THE DEFENDANTS' LANDLORD WHO 
MADE THE DECISION NOT TO PROPERLY MAINTAIN THE BUILDING, IS A 
BARE ASSERTION OF LEGALLY IRRELEVANT TO BASE OR TO RAISE A 
FACTUAL ISSUE TO PRECLUDE GRANTING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
KATHY GARCIA MAKES THAT STATEMENT, YOUR HONOR, IN THE AFFIDAVIT 
THAT COUNSEL FILED IN OPPOSITION TO OUR MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, BUT THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF MELBY VS. 
WILLIAMS, AND THIS WAS A CASE THAT WAS SUBMITTED BY PLAINTIFF'S 
COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. THAT CASE OF MELBY VS. WILLIAMS, WHICH IS A 1985 
CASE, TALKS ABOUT THE QUESTION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. AND 
THE COURT SPECIFICALLY SAID THE FOLLOWING. THEY SAID THE 
DEFENDANTS ATTACK THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE AFFIDAVIT TO RAISE A 
QUESTION OF FACT ASSERTING THAT THE AFFIDAVIT MERELY STATES 
A CONCLUSION WHICH IS INSUFFICIENT TO PRECLUDE THE GRANTING OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE MOTION. 
THEN THE COURT HELD THIS. AN AFFIDAVIT WHICH MERELY 
REFLECTS THE AFFIANTS' UNSUBSTANTIATED CONCLUSIONS IN WHICH 
SALES TO STATE EVIDENTIARY FACTS IS INSUFFICIENT TO CREATE AN 
ISSUE OF FACT. AND THAT'S REALLY ABSOLUTELY THE SITUATION 
WITH THE STATEMENTS OF KATHY GARCIA AND THE STATEMENTS THAT WERE 
PRESENTED BY COUNSEL IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR AFFIDAVIT 
OPPOSING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE FILE 
TO SUBSTANTIATE THAT OR TO SHOW. 
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WHO PAID 
BUILDING. 
FAIR AND 
BY CONTRAST, THE DEFENDANTS SHOWED THE PAYMENTS; 
THEM; WHO HAD THE RESPONSIBILITY OF KEEPING THE j 
I REALLY THINK THAT THE ORDER WE SUBMITTED IS 
ACCURATE BASED UPON THE COURT'S DECISION. 
THE ORDER SHOULD BE APPROVED. 
MR. 
PROPOSED 
THANK YOU. 
HENNING: YOUR HONOR, THE CONCERN I HAVE 
ORDERS, IT DOESN'T DEAL WITH WHAT I FEEL 
EVIDENTIARY FACTS RAISED. AND I FEEL THE COURT'S 
BE BASED, 
THAT CAN 
AS I STATED IN MY ORDER, THAT REGARDLESS 
WE THINK 
WITH COUNSEL'S 
WERE THE 
DECISION MUST 
OF THE INFERENCE 
BE DRAWN FROM THE ALLEGATIONS AND THE DEPOSITION 
TESTIMONY OF MR. WORTLEY THAT HE WAS FUNDING THE 
SERVICAR, 
OPERATION OF 
I FEEL THE COURT'S DECISION MUST HAVE BEEN BASED 
ON THE LEASE PROVISION AND REGARDLESS OF ALL THESE 
WE RAISE, 
: ISSUES 
THE COURT MUST HAVE FELT THOSE ISSUES ARE IRRELEVANT 
AND THE LEASE CONTROLLED. AND THAT'S WHY I WORDEC 
THE WAY I 
GARCIA'S 
WHERE HE 
DID. 
I RECITED THE FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS, BOTH 
AFFIDAVIT AND THE DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF 
ADMITTED HE WAS FUNDING THE OPERATION OF 
AND I SAID REGARDLESS OF THESE MATTERS, THE COURT 
BASED ON THE LEASE PROVISION, THAT THE OBLIGATION 
THE BUILDING WAS A RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PLAINTIFF 
> THE ORDER 
1 IN KATHY 
' THE DEFENDANT 
SERVICAR. 
FEELS THAT 1 
TO MAINTAIN 
'S EMPLOYERS 
OF SERVICAR OF UTAH, AND THEREFORE THE DEFENDANT LANDLORDS HAD 
NO RESPONSIBILITY. AND IF I'M MISTAKEN ABOUT THE COURT'S RULING, | 
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THAT'S FINE, BUT I WOULD LIKE A CLARIFICATION ON THAT. I THOUGHT 
THERE WERE FACTUAL ISSUES, INFERENCES THAT RAISE A FACTUAL ISSUE. 
AND I WOULD LIKE THE COURT'S ORDER TO REFLECT HOW THE COURT DEALS 
WITH THOSE FACTUAL ISSUES OR WHY THE COURT FEELS THEY AREN'T 
TO BE SUBMITTED TO A JURY. 
THE COURT: IN REVIEWING THE ORDERS AND LISTENING TO ARGUMENT\ 
I'M OF THE OPINION THAT THE ORDER OF MR. HENNING SHOULD PROBABLY 
BE ACCEPTED, EXCEPT FOR NO. D. I THINK MR. SMEDLEY'S ARGUMENT 
WITH REGARDS OF THE BARE ASSERTION OF KATHY GARCIA IS NOT 
SUFFICIENT TO FACTUALLY ESTABLISH ANY DISPUTED ISSUE BECAUSE 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OTHER THAN HER BARE ASSERTIONS, AND I 
THINK THE SUPREME COURT RULING THAT YOU INDICATED IS CORRECT 
AS FAR AS THE CASE I READ. 
MR. HENNING: YOUR HONOR, PARAGRAPH D WAS INTENDED TO 
REFLECT THE AFFIDAVIT STATEMENT BY KATHY GARCIA THAT IT WAS 
THE DEFENDANTS, AS LANDLORDS, WHO MADE THE DECISION NOT TO 
PROPERLY MAINTAIN THE BUILDING IS A BARE ASSERTION AND LEGALLY 
IRRELEVANT TO RAISE A FACTUAL ISSUE TO PRECLUDE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. THAT WAS AN ATTEMPT TO REFLECT MR. SMEDLEY'S 
ARGUMENT ON THAT. I WOULD BE HAPPY TO MODIFY THAT AS THE COURT 
DEEMS APPROPRIATE. 
MR. SMEDLEY: WELL, YOUR HONOR, I DON'T THINK THE FACTS 
SHOW THAT WORTLEY WAS CONTRIBUTING HIS OWN FUNDS. THAT'S THE 
REASON WE OBJECT TO MR. HENNING'S PROPOSED ORDER. 
THE COURT: UH-HUH. 
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MR. SMEDLEY: THERE ARE NO FACTS TO SHOW THAT INDEED THAT 
WAS THE CASE, AND I THINK THAT FOR THAT TO BE THE ORDER IS 
EXTREMELY PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANTS BECAUSE THE FACTS 
SIMPLY DO NOT REFLECT THAT THAT WAS OCCURRING IN EITHER B OR 
C. 
MR. HENNING: YOUR HONOR, MR. SMEDLEY'S OWN CLIENT TESTIFIED 
IN HIS OWN DEPOSITION THAT HE WAS CONTRIBUTING FUNDS. THAT'S 
NOT EVEN AN ISSUE, AND I THINK THE COURT IN ITS RULING IN 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT HAS TO GIVE MY CLIENT ALL INFERENCES, CERTAINLY 
ALL STATEMENTS AND THAT'S THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT — MR. SMEDLEY KEEPS 
ARGUING FACTS. THE WHOLE CONCEPT BEHIND A SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IS THERE'S NO FACTUAL ISSUES --
THE COURT: JUST BASED ON WHAT'S BEEN ARGUED AND YOUR 
INDICATION, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT YOUR ORDER IS PROBABLY THE 
ONE THE COURT SHOULD ACCEPT AND EVEN D JUST BASED ON THE LAST 
PART OF THE PARAGRAPH WHERE IT SAYS BARE ASSERTION LEAVES — 
IRRELEVANT TO RAISE THE FACTUAL ISSUE PROVIDING GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. I THINK THAT'S WHAT THE COURTS HAVE HELD. 
MR. HENNING: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: SO, I'LL SIGN MR. HENNING'S ORDER HERE. 
MR. SMEDLEY: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
(WHEREUPON THIS MATTER WAS CONCLUDED.) 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS T_ Q 
420 KEARNS BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101 
A-13 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, KENNETH ALLEN, AN OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER FOR THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH , DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I REPORTED STENOGRAPHICALLY 
THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE MATTER OF KATHY GARCIA V. DAVID WARREN 
AND DON WORTLEY, CIVIL NO. C86-6709, AND THAT THE ABOVE AND 
FOREGOING IS A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPT OF SAID PROCEEDINGS, 
AS REPORTED BY ME AT THE TIME OF HEARING. 
DATED THIS 6TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 1988. 
KETlfiETH ALLEN, CSR 
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FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
Lee C. Henning, #4593 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHY GARCIA, ; 
Plaintiff, 
v.
 t 
DAVID WARREN and DON WORTLEY 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
) Civil No. C86-6709 
The defendants' Motion for Summary Judgement was heard 
before the Honorable Raymond S. Uno during the regular Law and 
Motion calendar of the Court on August 9, 1988 at 9:00 a.m. The 
plaintiff was present and was represented by her counsel of 
record, Lee C. Henning. The defendant Don Wortley was also 
present and was represented by his counsel of record, Stanley M. 
Smedley. The court considered the affidavits on file herein, the 
parties' memorandums of points and authorities, and the 
deposition testimony of Don Wortley. 
For good cause shown it is hereby ordered, adjudged and 
decreed that: 
The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgement is granted. 
The grounds for granting the motion are as follows: 
1 
SEP 1 1988 
^ j V deputy Clerk 
a. It is undisputed in the evidence submitted by the 
parties that the lease agreement between the defendants and their 
tenant, Servicar of Utah, provided that Servicar of Utah was 
responsible for maintenance of the building where the plaintiff 
was injured. 
b. The facts that Don Wortley was constantly funding 
Servicar7s operation with his own funds and that the decision to 
allow the building to fall into disrepair was a decision shared 
in by Don Wortley, and the inference raised from those facts that 
the landlords, David Warren and Don Wortley, were contributing 
and encouraging the poor maintenance of the building, are all 
legally irrelevant in light of the contractual provisions of the 
lease. Even assuming these facts did exist, the responsibility 
for maintenance of the building would not rest in the landlords 
and they would bear no liability for those actions. 
c. The facts that Don Wortley was contributing his 
own funds on a monthly basis to underwrite the operations of the 
tenant and that it was his reluctance to contribute greater funds 
that resulted in the poor maintenance of the building are also 
factually inadequate to raise an inference that the building 
maintenance was really the responsibility of the landlords as 
well as the tenant in light of the express lease provision 
between the landlords and tenant. 
d. The affidavit statement by Kathy Garcia that it 
was the defendants, as landlords, who made the decision not to 
properly maintain the building is a bare assertion and legally 
2 
A-16 
irrelevant to raise a factual issue to preclude granting summary 
judgement. 
DATED this 
<=*/ 
day of j P C V ^ ^ ^ 1988 
By the Court: 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
A _ - . - T ~ 3 -
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